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Do the Commons Help Augment Mutual Insurance among the Poor? 
Abstract 
Poor people rely on local commons not only for self-insurance, as commonly found, but 
also for mutual insurance, depending on resources and shocks. This paper demonstrates 
that this conjecture holds among cyclone victims in the Pacific Islands. On one hand, 
households increase coastal fishing and handicraft selling, but not forest-product 
gathering, to smooth income against own crop damage. On the other hand, households 
with undamaged housing intensify fishing to help other kin-group members with 
damaged housing. These distinct patterns of using commons as insurance are explained 
by distinct forms of risk sharing against these two shocks.   
Keywords: commons, self-insurance, mutual insurance, Pacific, Fiji 
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Do Commons Help Mutual Insurance? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Do poor people in developing areas rely on local commons to cope with adverse 
shocks? This question of “natural insurance” has received explicit attention among 
economists since the 1980s (e.g., Jodha, 1986), and recent systematic works based on 
micro survey data provide supportive evidence (e.g., Fisher and Shively, 2005; Hunter et 
al., 2007; McSweeney, 2005; Pattanayak and Sills, 2001). Theoretical works highlight the 
advantages of commons as a safety net, especially among the poor with limited coping 
options: Resource use is usually not so risky, it is often uncorrelated with shocks to 
primary activities like farming, and individual returns to it vary little across households. 
Baland and Francois (2005) demonstrate that even if a resource is equitably privatized, 
commons can have better insurance properties than insurance markets with information 
and enforcement problems. Delacote’s (2007) related theoretical work examines how the 
insurance role of tropical forests is related to deforestation. The natural insurance concept 
has led to an increasing recognition that environmental conservation is important for the 
poor, not only for income earnings but also as a safety net (Angelsen and Wunder, 2003).  
Previous works on natural insurance, or, more generally, ex post labor supply, 
focus on its role as self-insurance against households’ own shocks: With greater adverse 
shocks, income is lower and households will increase labor supply to smooth income (i.e., 
the income effect) (Kochar, 1999; Rose, 2001). Do households with no or small adverse 
shocks increase labor supply to augment mutual insurance for helping others? In this 
paper, I test this resource-augmentation effect, which researchers have not yet explored, 
though Rosenzweig (2001) emphasizes the connection between self-insurance and mutual 
  
2 
 
insurance as a future research agenda. The resource-augmentation effect broadens the 
role of the ex post labor supply as it is linked with risk sharing.  
My conjecture is that whether the income effect or the resource-augmentation 
effect works depends on risk-return relationships of labor activities, because donors can 
take more high-risk, high-return options than recipients can. Most previous works on 
natural insurance examine wood and non-timber forest products (NTFPs) in forest-rich 
environments. As an exception, Takasaki et al. (2004; 2010) reveal that in the lowland 
Amazon, where both forest and riverine resources are rich, people more commonly resort 
to riverine fishing than NTFP gathering to cope with flood damage. Using original survey 
data, I compare forest and marine resources in the Pacific Islands, where the latter is 
much richer than the former. Although NTFP gathering offers very low returns to labor 
with almost no risk, people can make value-added handicrafts from NTFPs (the insurance 
role of handicrafts has received very little attention in previous works); coastal fishing is 
a high-risk, high-return activity. Hence, marine resources match mutual insurance better 
than forest resources. The analysis confirms that although the income effect works in 
both fishing and handicraft selling against crop damage caused by a tropical cyclone, the 
resource-augmentation effect works in only fishing against housing damage. I discuss 
how these distinct patterns of using commons as insurance are explained by distinct 
forms of risk sharing against these two shocks.   
A better understanding of natural insurance’s role in small island states, whose 
environments are highly vulnerable and economies heavily rely on foreign aid (Bertram, 
1986), is critically important for successful resource management and safety-net policy. 
Some researchers criticize the deterioration of islanders’ indigenous mechanisms in 
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coping with cyclones because of their increasing dependency on emergency aid (e.g., 
Campbell, 1984). Contrary to extensive anthropological studies, economic studies based 
on household survey data are almost nonexistent in the Pacific region. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the study area, 
the cyclone, and labor activities before and after the cyclone. Section 3 develops 
empirical strategies to test the income and resource-augmentation effects, which is 
followed by the results in Section 4 and discussion in Section 5. The last section 
concludes.       
2. STUDY AREA, CYCLONE, AND LABOR ACTIVITIES 
(a) Study area and data 
Tropical cyclones are the largest natural disaster in Pacific island states. On 
January 13, 2003, Cyclone Ami swept over the northern and eastern regions of the Fiji 
Islands; Ami was the only cyclone in the northern region from 1991 through 2005 
(McKenzie et al., 2005). Nine native Fijian villages on the coast in the northern region, 
with distinct environmental and economic conditions, were intentionally chosen for the 
survey. Six and three villages, respectively, are located on Vanua Levu and Taveuni 
Islands, the second- and third-largest islands in the country, which significantly lag 
behind the largest island, Viti Levu, where the state capital, two international airports, 
and most tourism businesses are situated. After being stratified for each of the selected 
villages by kin group, households were randomly sampled in each stratum (n=374); the 
analyses of this paper are conducted for 332 households with complete data.1
Household interviews were conducted between late August and early November 
2003. Enumerators visited each household once within this time frame and inquired about 
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production, income, assets, demographics, cyclone damage, and relief; neither 
consumption nor labor transfer data were collected. As such, like other post-disaster 
surveys (e.g., Morris et al., 2002), the survey collected pre- and post-cyclone information 
retrospectively (I will discuss retrospective errors in Section 3). 
(b) Cyclone damage, housing rehabilitation, and relief 
The total cyclone damage across the country is estimated at F$104 million, of 
which housing damage is F$22 million and crop damage is F$40 million (1 Fiji dollar = 
US$.60) (National Disaster Management Office, 2003). All nine sample villages 
experienced damage to their structures and facilities, and housing damage and crop 
damage are the two major damages individual households experienced. According to 
respondents’ subjective assessments, the cyclone damaged 53% of residents’ houses: 8% 
were completely destroyed and 45% were partially damaged (see Table 1). I label 
households with damaged and undamaged housing victims and non-victims, respectively. 
Almost all households engaged in cropping (and fishing), and 86% experienced crop 
damage. The mean value of damaged crops was F$34 per adult equivalent, which was 
57% of the mean monthly pre-cyclone crop income (crop damage was calculated based 
on the quantity damaged for each major crop, as reported by respondents). 
{Table 1 here} 
Variance of the household-level housing- and crop-damage measures is 
decomposed into village, kin-group (village sub-group), and household levels by 
allowing for village- or group-level means. In practice, the village-level variance (percent 
of total variance) is the R-squared of a regression on a full set of village dummies; the 
group-level variance is the R-squared of a regression on a full set of group dummies, 
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minus the village-level variance. The contribution of the village-level variance to total 
variance is small (less than 7%), that of the group-level variance is considerable (10-
16%), and most variance exists at the household level (77-85%). As such, in the 
regression analyses below, I focus on household-level idiosyncratic shock and group-
level covariate shock.2
Housing damage and crop damage are not correlated with each other. Correlations 
of housing damage with crop damage and crop-damage value are .001 and -.0145, 
respectively, and correlations of the proportion of damaged housing in the kin group with 
the proportion of households with damaged crops in the group and the group mean of 
crop-damage value are -,068 and .022, respectively; none of these results are statistically 
significant (the comparison of non-victims and victims in Table 1 shows comparable 
results).  
  
Thirty-seven percent of victims became refugees who stayed in others’ residences 
in the same village (according to a village survey conducted in each sample village, 
permanent migration was nonexistent). About half of the refugees lived with households 
in the same kin group; that is, the kin group served as a risk-sharing group. Non-victims 
helped victims rehabilitate their housing, though with no data on across-household labor 
transfers, I cannot tell how people actually helped each other. At the same time, villagers 
contributed to rehabilitating damaged village facilities. Using the same Fijian data, 
Takasaki (forthcoming) shows that contributions of communal labor (mainly male) are 
smaller among households with damaged housing and with greater crop damage; that is, 
communal labor corresponding to village-level covariate shock involves risk-sharing 
arrangements against household-level idiosyncratic shocks. At the time of interviews, 
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refugees were almost nonexistent and about two thirds of victims had completed housing 
rehabilitation: 9% had built a new house and 55% had completed repairs. As the 
government provisioned most construction materials more than one year after the cyclone, 
these housing rehabilitations were accomplished by people’s mutual help.   
The Red Cross, other nongovernmental organizations, and the government 
delivered relief. Emergency food aid was the largest form of relief in the region. Almost 
all sample households received some food aid by April and they received about 10 days 
worth of food per month, on average, until September; that is, an average household 
could rely on aid to cover about one third of its food consumption (Takasaki, 
forthcoming).3
(c) Labor activities 
 The value of the total 90-day food ration over nine months, F$156 per 
capita, is 4.5 times the average crop damage per adult equivalent. In contrast, primitive 
tarpaulins – to be used as emergency shelters and for temporary housing repair – were 
provisioned to only 12% of households (mostly victims) by June.   
Panel A of Table 2 compares incomes earned from labor activities before and 
after the cyclone. Cropping and fishing accounted for 54% and 29%, respectively, of total 
income before the cyclone.4 Distinct from housing rehabilitation, households individually 
rehabilitated cropping by collecting harvestable damaged crops, cleaning fields, and 
planting seeds. People planted fast-growing crops (like sweet potato) after seeds were 
provisioned as part of the relief, and the harvest had already started before the interviews. 
Recovery was still incomplete: The mean post-cyclone crop income was about 40% 
lower than the pre-cyclone level. Fishing income also decreased significantly after the 
cyclone.  
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{Table 2 here} 
The collection of NTFPs, such as wild fruits (excluding those used for handicraft 
making), and handicraft selling (in local markets and small resort hotels for tourists) 
contributed negligibly to total income before the cyclone.5 These two minor activities 
were almost nonexistent throughout the previous year in three of the nine sample villages. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports participation in and revenues from these two activities in the 
remaining six participant villages (n=223) by quarter – pre-cyclone period 1 (October-
December 2002) and post-cyclone periods 2-4 (January-March, April-June, and July-
September 2003, respectively). In period 2 right after the cyclone, households abandoned 
NTFP gathering. Most NTFPs are seasonal,6 but seasonality only partly explains this 
pattern; the deteriorated access to gathering sites caused by downed trees and debris 
precluded gathering in some but not all locations. The most likely reason for this was to 
free labor for other coping activities under a state of emergency. Gathering recovered in 
periods 3 and 4, while participation was still much lower than in period 1. Participation in 
and revenues from handicraft selling did not change much from period 1 to period 2 but 
increased later. This pattern matches the recovery of tourists’ demand. These results 
suggest that after the emergency period, households shifted labor from risky fishing and 
NTFP gathering with low returns to production of value-added handicrafts.7
(d) Comparison of victims and non-victims 
  
Victims and non-victims did not significantly differ from each other in their pre-
cyclone incomes, asset holdings (land and fishing capital), and other household 
characteristics (Panel A of Table 2); the only exception is that households with a younger 
head were more likely to experience housing damage. This is because they relied more on 
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inferior construction materials (thatched walls or ground floors covered by a mat, cf. 
wood walls and floors, Takasaki, forthcoming). Housing damage could also be related to 
the micro location of housing within each village, the data of which are lacking. Put 
differently, pre-cyclone labor activities, asset holdings, and most other household 
characteristics are not correlated with such housing quality. At the same time, non-
victims earned greater total income after the cyclone than victims, especially in fishing 
(the difference is significant at only a 12% significance level). Thus, ex post fishing 
adjustments were somewhat different between victims and non-victims.    
3. ANALYSES 
This section develops empirical strategies to test the income effect and the 
resource-augmentation effect, followed by discussions of estimation strategies, covariates, 
and measurement errors. 
(a) Income effect 
The income effect suggests that a household increases labor supply in response to 
adverse shocks. Rose (2001) offers a theoretical framework for household labor-supply 
decisions in response to a covariate shock to farm production (regional rainfall). Adding 
an idiosyncratic shock to her model yields the ex post labor-supply equation 
( )M,X,W,zLL = , 
where L is labor supply; z and W, respectively, are adverse household-level idiosyncratic 
shock and village-level covariate shock; and X and M, respectively, are household- and 
village-level factors that affect returns to labor, such as productive assets and market 
prices. The estimating equation is: 
itivtititit euVXzL +++++= γββ 10 .     (1)  
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where i, v, and t stand for household, village, and time, respectively; Vvt is time-varying 
village dummies, which capture all village-level factors, such as village-level covariate 
shock and seasonality (see below for more discussion); ui is unobservable household 
heterogeneity; and eit is a time-variant error term that is individually and independently 
distributed. Previous works on ex post labor supply and natural insurance largely employ 
equation (1). The income effect against own household-level shock (self-insurance) is 
captured by positive β1. I extend equation (1) to  
itivtitgtitit euVXwzL ++++++= γβββ 210 ,    (2)  
where wgt is group-level covariate shock of a group g (kin group in the Fijian case).   
Risk sharing among group members lowers the demand for income smoothing 
through self-insurance. In the extreme case of full risk sharing, the labor supply is 
unresponsive to household-level idiosyncratic shock, while the income effect can work 
against uninsured group-level covariate shock. As the full risk-sharing model captures 
consumption smoothing against idiosyncratic shock after households earn ex post labor 
income, reduced-form equations (1) and (2) capture the household-labor response to 
idiosyncratic shock after it is weakened by risk sharing. In this way, unobservable 
welfare weights used in risk sharing affect household labor-supply decisions. Hence, to 
identify the income effect against idiosyncratic shock, researchers need to control for 
household heterogeneity ui using fixed-effects estimators; this is true for any 
idiosyncratic shocks, such as sickness.8
(b) Resource-augmentation effect 
      
The resource-augmentation effect suggests that additional labor income increases 
shared resources. To clearly illustrate my empirical strategy to test for the resource-
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augmentation effect, which consists of two steps, consider a hypothetical situation where 
an idiosyncratic shock – exogenous as a determinant of labor supply – is a dummy 
variable that largely distinguishes recipients (R) and donors (D) of private transfers 
among group members. The group mean of this dummy, the proportion of households 
with the shock (i.e., recipients) in the group, measures group-level covariate shock. The 
first step examines whether donors with no shock increase labor supply in response to the 
shocks experienced by recipients in the same group. This is captured by the positive 
coefficient of this group-level shock – measured in the whole sample – in equation (2) 
run for the donor sample (i.e., βD2 > 0). In the whole sample, then, the positive coefficient 
of the group-level shock (β2 > 0) can be a result of either the income effect or the 
resource-augmentation effect, or both.  
Positive βD2 does not necessarily mean that donors augment transfers to recipients. 
With a lack of across-household labor-transfer data in Fiji, the second step examines how 
the ex post labor supply is related to housing rehabilitation (if consumption data were 
available, the same analysis could be done about consumption smoothing). The resource-
augmentation effect suggests that the greater ex post labor supply among donors, the 
better smoothing (rehabilitation) among recipients. In particular, risk sharing depends on 
donors’ resources per recipient that can be shared within groups. I thus conduct a group-
level correlation analysis to test the following: (1) Housing rehabilitation is positively 
correlated with the total labor supply of donors, but not recipients, in the group 
(hypothesis 1); (2) Housing rehabilitation is positively correlated with the labor supply of 
donors per recipient in the group (hypothesis 2); (3) This correlation of donors’ labor 
supply per recipient is greater than that of their group mean labor supply (hypothesis 3).  
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In practice, the clear division of donors and recipients in risk sharing against a 
particular idiosyncratic shock is very unlikely, because it is affected by other shocks and 
factors (like wealth). What researchers can do is to conduct the sub-sample analysis on 
each major idiosyncratic shock (housing damage and crop damage in the Fijian case). 
That βD2 is positive and hypotheses 1-3 hold for housing damage is good evidence that 
non-victims and victims are main donors and recipients, respectively, in the risk sharing 
among group members for housing rehabilitation.  
My conjecture is that the resource-augmentation effect is stronger in marine-
resource use than in forest-resource use, because of their distinct risk-return relationships. 
I analyze fishing and handicraft selling separately (NTFP gathering yields regression 
results with very weak overall significance, probably because of very uncommon 
participation after the cyclone).  
(c) Estimation strategies 
As many households do not participate in handicraft selling (Panel B of Table 2), 
I employ the trimmed least-squares estimator developed by Honoré (1992) to control for 
unobservable household heterogeneity ui with a censored dependent variable. Another 
advantage of this fixed-effects model, which has not been used in previous works on the 
ex post labor supply, is that it is robust to heteroskedasticity and non-normality, which 
are other potential sources of bias in random-effects Tobit estimates. I employ the first-
difference estimator for fishing, participation in which is almost universal.   
When do people rely on natural insurance against the cyclone, during the 
emergency period or after? To answer this question, I conduct two-period analyses of 
handicraft selling separately for periods 1 and 2, periods 1 and 3, and periods 1 and 4. In 
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the latter two, labor input in period 3 or 4 is connected with the shocks experienced in 
period 2. This is a standard practice in analyzing annual survey data that lack information 
over time within the year. A potential problem is that coping behaviors in the previous 
post-cyclone period(s) correlated with shocks may affect decisions in the subsequent 
period as an “unobservable” time-variant factor. I repeat the analyses constructing 
dependent variables over periods 2-3 or periods 2-4, finding very similar results. In the 
two-period model for fishing, the ex post data are measured at the time of interviews.  
With a lack of time-allocation information, I use revenues as a proxy for labor 
inputs (revenues are a better proxy than incomes). The fixed-effects and first-difference 
estimators control for any systematic difference between revenues and labor inputs 
caused by unobservable, time-invariant factors, such as skills and resource stocks (in the 
Fijian data, fishing capital is also time-invariant, as discussed shortly); village-time 
dummies control for market prices, which determine revenues. The group-level 
correlation analysis to test hypotheses 1-3 is conducted for revenues and incomes 
(incomes better capture resources that can be shared).  
(d) Covariates 
Household-level shock zit consists of two dummies for partial housing damage 
and complete damage and the value of crop damage per adult equivalent (log). Household 
crop damage is endogenous, because unobservable household and village characteristics, 
such as land quality, farming skills, market conditions, and environmental conditions, 
which affect household pre-cyclone cropping decisions and thus crop damage, can be 
correlated with its ex post labor-supply decisions. In the Fiji data, most of these 
unobservable factors are fixed effects ui, which can be controlled for. Housing quality 
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(construction materials and micro location), which affects housing damage, is also fixed 
effects. In equation (2), group-level shock wgt is captured by the group means of the three 
household-level shocks. The group-mean estimates should be reasonably accurate 
because, on average, the sample includes about 70% of households in each stratum 
defined by kin group. 
Potential selection bias in the sub-sample analysis on housing damage is unlikely 
to be a major concern, because victims and non-victims differ from each other only in 
their housing quality, as discussed above. In the sub-sample analysis on crop damage, I 
consider various breakpoints in crop-damage value (the analysis on a dummy for crop 
damage is infeasible because most households experienced the damage). This analysis is 
at best very preliminary, because endogenous crop-damage value can cause significant 
selection bias. Still, it can highlight the potential contrast to housing damage. 
Village-time dummies Vvt capture all village-level factors: village-level shocks to 
housing and crops (which are shown to be small above), damage to village structures and 
facilities, village-level seasonality (e.g., change in resource stock), and relief received by 
the village. Though, for example, relief allocations across villages might be correlated 
with unobservable village-level factors that determine returns to labor activities, such 
factors are fully controlled for by the village-time dummies. Relief received by individual 
households is not included as an explanatory variable, because it is endogenously 
determined as part of private risk sharing within villages (Dercon and Krishnan, 2005; 
Takasaki, forthcoming). A time dummy controls for region-level covariate shocks and 
seasonality, and other common events or trends. In the Fijian data, household-level 
factors that affect returns to labor Xit, such as productive assets and demographic factors, 
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are fixed effects. In particular, fishing capital and land holdings hardly changed in the 
previous year (no land was lost because of the cyclone).  
(e) Measurement errors 
Special attention needs to be given to measurement errors in the retrospective data. 
First of all, errors in the measure of housing damage are minimal, because relief officers 
used the same categories for their damage assessments (the damage status of each house 
was common knowledge among villagers). Measurement errors in the value of crop 
damage can be considerable and systematic. I repeated the analyses using the crop-
damage dummy, the errors of which should be minimal, finding qualitatively the same 
results.  
Respondents’ memory inaccuracy in early periods may have caused the evolution 
of production found above. Such memory inaccuracy should be small for participation, 
because the very minor activity of NTFP gathering was much less common in periods 3 
and 4 than in period 1; though measurement errors in the timing of handicraft production 
may be systematically correlated with household-level shocks, similar estimation results 
using combined post-cyclone periods discussed above suggest that such errors are 
unlikely to be a major concern.  
Although respondents could well recall the production of handicrafts because they 
are culturally and socially important among Fijians (Turner, 1987), handicraft and fishing 
revenues may contain significant errors. The time dummy and village-time dummies 
control for common memory inaccuracy, but the correlation of errors in pre-cyclone 
revenues with household-level shocks can cause significant bias. There is no way to 
control for this potential bias. A positive (negative) correlation – households with larger 
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shocks tend to report higher (lower) pre-cyclone revenues than actual revenues – causes 
upward (downward) bias. Thus, unless the correlation is positive and large, estimated 
positive β1 (income effect) should be qualitatively robust. In contrast, in the sub-sample 
analysis for non-victims (with no damaged housing), such potential bias caused by 
housing damage is irrelevant. Hence, estimated positive βD2 for victims’ housing damage 
in the group (resource-augmentation effect) should be robust. The group-level correlation 
analysis using data at the time of interviews should not involve major recall errors.   
4. RESULTS 
The first-difference estimates of determinants of log fishing revenues per adult 
equivalent per month are reported in Table 3, where robust standard errors are reported 
and standard errors are clustered by kin group in equation (2). The first two columns 
show results for the whole sample. Households intensify fishing against their own crop 
damage, but not housing damage, in equation (1) (i.e., β1 > 0); in equation (2), the crop 
damage loses its statistical significance, but when standard errors are not clustered by 
group, it is significant at the 5% level (results not shown). Though the marginal effect of 
crop-damage value is small (.7% for a 10% increase in damage), that of the crop-damage 
dummy is about 28% (results not shown). Hence, the income effect of fishing works 
against own crop damage. At the same time, households in a kin group with more 
complete housing damage intensify fishing, though group-level partial housing damage 
and crop damage exhibit no significant impacts.  
{Table 3 here} 
The results of sub-sample analyses for non-victims and victims are reported in 
columns (3)-(4) and columns (5)-(6), respectively. Group-level complete and partial 
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housing damage, but not crop damage, positively influences non-victims only (i.e., βD2 > 
0). Non-victims intensify fishing against victims’ housing damage in the group; the 
marginal effect of complete damage is greater than that of partial damage (14% and 8%, 
respectively, for an additional victim in an average kin group with 10 member 
households). This gives rise to the distinct post-cyclone fishing incomes between non-
victims and victims found above. In contrast, no group-level shocks show a significant 
impact in the sub-sample analysis on crop damage (columns 7-10) (the breakpoint is the 
median of crop-damage value, F$18.9; using other percentiles as a breakpoint yields 
qualitatively the same results).  
The results of the group-level correlation analysis – weighted by kin-group size – 
of fishing revenues are reported in column (1) of Table 4, where housing rehabilitation is 
measured by the proportion of housing rehabilitated – new housing built or repair 
completed – among victims in kin groups (groups with no victims are dropped). Housing 
rehabilitation is positively correlated with non-victims’ total fishing revenues and their 
revenues per victim in the group, but not their group-mean revenues; that is, hypotheses 
1-3 all strongly hold. The analysis of fishing incomes yields almost the same results 
(results not shown). Overall then, the resource-augmentation effect works against housing 
damage: Non-victims (as main donors) intensify fishing to help the rehabilitation of 
victims (as main recipients) in kin groups. Moreover, the resource-augmentation effect 
corresponds to the severity of housing damage.9
{Table 4 here} 
  
Trimmed least-squares estimates for log handicraft sales per adult equivalent per 
month, for the whole sample in six handicraft villages, are reported in Table 5 (the 
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sample size is too small for a sub-sample analysis). Households with greater own crop 
damage, not housing damage, sell more handicrafts (i.e., β1 > 0) in period 3; at the same 
time, no group-level shocks exhibit significant impacts. The group-level correlation 
analysis for six handicraft villages in periods 2-4 shows that hypotheses 1-3 do not hold 
at all (column 2 of Table 4).10
{Table 5 here} 
 Hence, the income effect of handicraft selling works 
against crop damage, though the resource-augmentation effect is nonexistent.  
5. DISCUSSION 
Why does fishing’s resource-augmentation effect work for housing damage, but 
not crop damage? Why does the income effect work for crop damage, but not housing 
damage? I argue that risk sharing against these two shocks works differently for two 
reasons. First, donors and recipients in risk sharing for housing rehabilitation are much 
more sharply distinguished from each other than those for consumption smoothing 
against crop damage. This is because depending on housing quality, which is very 
observable among kin-group members, housing damage divided households almost 
equally into victims and non-victims, and thus there is approximately one non-victim 
(potential donor) for each victim (potential recipient), on average. In contrast, most 
households experienced crop damage and its magnitude was determined by their pre-
cyclone cropping decisions, and cropping efforts are less observable than housing quality. 
These contrasts of housing damage and crop damage are reflected in earlier descriptive 
findings on mutual help and its absence – co-residence for refugees among kin members, 
risk-sharing arrangements in communal labor, and the absence of labor sharing in crop 
rehabilitation.  
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Second, compared to generous emergency food aid, which must have greatly 
helped households’ consumption smoothing against crop damage, very limited relief was 
available for housing rehabilitation – limited tarpaulins and no construction materials. 
Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) theoretically demonstrate that public transfer crowds out 
private transfer in risk sharing, because in the risk-sharing arrangement with limited 
enforceability, public transfer, which increases the value of autarky relative to the value 
of staying in the contract, reduces the degree of risk sharing (they obtain supporting 
evidence in Mexico’s PROGRESA program, and Dercon and Krishnan, 2005 find similar 
results for food aid in rural Ethiopia). If cyclone relief crowds out risk sharing against 
cyclone shocks in Fiji, it should be much greater for that against crop damage than 
housing damage (with only nine sample villages, examining potential crowding-out of 
informal risk sharing caused by cyclone relief is infeasible). As a result, people rely more 
on self-insurance against crop damage and mutual insurance against housing damage.  
Why does handicraft’s income effect work in period 3 only? I argue that the 
demand for self-insurance against crop damage changes over time. The income effect 
was weak under emergency, because people could collect harvestable damaged crops and 
needed quick help through mutual insurance (co-residence for refugees and emergency 
repair of damaged housing). The demand for self-insurance was augmented in the lean 
period 3, when households were still waiting to harvest rehabilitated crops. The demand 
decreased in period 4, when people started to harvest rehabilitated crops and received a 
good cumulative amount of food aid; an increase in handicraft sales at that time is mainly 
explained by seasonality, in particular, the recovery of tourists’ demand.   
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6. CONCLUSION 
Poor people rely on local commons not only for self-insurance, as commonly 
found, but also for mutual insurance. Their choices depend on resources, which involve 
distinct risk-return relationships, and shocks, against which informal risk sharing can 
work differently. This paper demonstrated that this conjecture holds among cyclone 
victims in the Pacific Islands. On one hand, households increase coastal fishing and 
handicraft selling to smooth income against own crop damage. On the other hand, 
households with undamaged housing intensify fishing to help other kin-group members 
with damaged housing. Both responses occur after the emergency period; during the 
emergency period, people abandon forest-product gathering.  
Hence, local commons can play a broader role as a safety net than normally 
thought for two reasons. First, even if resource use is too risky for self-insurance (e.g., 
fishing), it is not too risky for donors to augment mutual insurance, especially when 
mutual insurance works strongly (e.g., housing rehabilitation). Second, the value-adding 
process (e.g., handicraft making) strengthens the self-insurance role of poor local 
commons. This is important when mutual insurance works weakly (e.g., crop damage). 
Under the emergency situation right after a disaster, however, people do not resort to 
natural self-insurance but instead rely on private risk sharing and disaster relief, if any 
(whether commons help mutual insurance at that time is an unanswered question).  
These findings suggest the strong demand for integrating community-based 
resource management and broad safety-net policies. As seen in Fiji, however, different 
management groups may correspond to different natural resources (e.g., forest vs. sea), 
and management groups may not match risk-sharing groups. More research on the link of 
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local resource use and management with informal risk sharing is needed. In some locales 
like Fiji, development of handicraft enterprises and markets is promising for both income 
enhancement and better safety nets.  
Notes 
1 Fijians are divided almost equally into native Fijians and Indo-Fijians, and the study 
focuses on the former. The hierarchical kin structure of native Fijians is well known 
among anthropologists: The bottom is tokatoka, followed by mataqali, yavusa, and vanua, 
and each native Fijian belongs to one tokatoka, which belongs to one mataqali, and so 
forth (Ravuvu, 1983). Vanua ranges over several villages, roughly matching a district; 
there is one or a few yavusa in each village. In each sample village, households were 
stratified by tokatoka, the smallest kin-group unit. Households were also stratified for 
each tokatoka, depending on whether they hold leadership status or major assets (such as 
a shop), or not. This paper focuses on tokatoka as a kin group. To better capture group-
level factors, several tokatoka consisting of only one household are dropped. The sample 
for the analyses includes 15 yavusa, 36 mataqali, and 49 tokatoka (all nine villages 
contain more than one tokatoka and mataqali).  
2 With only nine villages in the sample, a statistical analysis of village-level covariate 
shocks is infeasible; at the same time, as the survey covers only the northern region in the 
small island state, variations in village-level shocks in the study area are very limited. To 
analyze village-level covariate shocks, data covering a large number of villages with 
much richer spatial variations – ideally including villages with no cyclone damage – are 
needed (in Fiji, such data should be based on a national sample covering all regions). If 
historical covariate shock data with rich regional variations were also available, ex ante 
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labor-supply decisions against risk could be explored. Using such data in Guatemala, 
Pörtner (2008) examines how hurricane risks and shocks affect fertility and education. 
This paper focuses on ex post labor-supply decisions. 
3 Because respondents found it difficult to specify the monetary value of food aid they 
received, they instead were asked the quantity, measured in the number of days it would 
have taken to consume the food in normal periods (not actual duration). The cost of the 
food ration is estimated at F$1.73 per person per day (National Disaster Management 
Office, 2003).  
4 Households employ traditional cropping practices (using no mechanized equipment or 
animal traction and limited purchased inputs) to produce mainly taro, cassava, coconut, 
and kava. Households engage in subsistence fishing using lines and hooks, simple spear 
guns, or rudimentary nets, and more commercially oriented fishermen use boats and 
engines, along with more valuable nets. Rural land is communally owned by mataqali, 
and is privately used, and by law it cannot be sold (communal land consists of about 83% 
of the country’s total land). Customary rights for coastal fishing are held by vanua or 
several yavusa, which often consist of several villages. In some fishing areas, regulations 
such as the bans on Sunday fishing and gill nets exist (no fishing regulations were altered 
after the cyclone). Enumerators asked questions about the production of major crops and 
the catch of finfish and other marine products in the past one month, and then monthly 
production a year before, in comparison with the latest figures (the contribution of other 
marine products to total income was much smaller than that of finfish). 
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5 NTFPs on communal land are open access not only to mataqali members but also to all 
villagers, and forest extraction is unregulated. The three most important handicrafts are 
famous Fijian mats, voivoi (made of screw pine, Pandanus thurstonii), finer mats, kuta 
(made of soft sedge, Eleocharis dulcis), and bark cloths, tapa (made of paper mulberry, 
Broussnetia papyrifera). These handicrafts are made exclusively by women and are 
extensively used for ceremonial gifts (Turner, 1987); some craftswomen sell their 
products. Enumerators asked about NTFP gathering and handicraft production in each 
month over the past one year. 
6 In the village survey, respondents were asked to list major NTFPs, finfish species, and 
other marine products harvested by villagers and whether or not each product is seasonal. 
Among all products listed, 91%, 17%, and 77% of NTFPs (excluding firewood), finfish 
species, and other marine products, respectively, are seasonal (unweighted).   
7 Potential coping activities other than private transfers played very minor roles. Casual 
wage labor, a focus of previous studies on the ex post labor supply, was very rare, 
contributing negligibly to the total income (Panel A of Table 2). Livestock selling also 
contributed little. The disposition of fishing capital and the transfer of usufruct of land 
after the cyclone were nonexistent. Formal credits and insurance were nonexistent. 
8 Numerous works test the full risk-sharing hypothesis using the equation  
itivtitit vuVzc ++++= 10 αα ,        
where cit is household consumption (Cochrane, 1991; Mace, 1991; Townsend, 1994). The 
null hypothesis is that household consumption is unaffected by idiosyncratic shock, as 
households efficiently share available resources that are altered only by covariate shock, 
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i.e., α1 = 0. As unobservable welfare weights used in risk sharing are correlated with 
idiosyncratic shock, fixed-effects estimators are required to obtain unbiased estimates. To 
examine risk sharing within groups other than villages, such as castes (Morduch, 2005) 
and household networks (De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), 
researchers have employed the following extended model 
itivtgtitit vuVwzc +++++= 210 ααα .       
Although this extension is the same as the extension of equation (1) to (2), the 
interpretation of group-level shock is different from that in (2), which is offered shortly: 
If risk is shared at the village level and not group, the addition of group-level shock is 
redundant, because village-level shock is already controlled for; its significant impact on 
consumption means that risk is shared among group members. 
9 I repeated the analyses using mataqali as alternative kin group, finding very similar 
results. Hence, the resource-augmentation effect works mostly within tokatoka, a sub-
group of mataqali, suggesting that mutual insurance is mainly available among close kin 
members. I also extended the regression analyses as follows. First, individual returns to 
fishing should vary across households, depending on their fishing-capital holdings (cf. 
forest-resource use). To see whether the income effect of ex post fishing depends on 
capital holdings, as found by Takasaki et al. (2010), I add interaction terms of household-
level shocks with pre-cyclone individual fishing capital holdings per adult equivalent 
(log) (recall that capital holdings are essentially fixed effects in the Fijian data). Second, 
as in other developing regions, share fishing is relatively common in the study area – 
households that are poor in fishing capital work with others with large holdings in 
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exchange for a share of the catch (Platteau and Nugent, 1992). To see whether the 
resource-augmentation effect depends on group members’ capital holdings, I add 
interaction terms of group-level shocks with the group mean of individual capital 
holdings. Third, inequalities are often considered a potential determinant of the use of 
commons, and mixed results of their effects are found in the literature (e.g., Alix-Garcia, 
2008; Baland and Platteau, 1997). Previous work has not explored how inequalities 
influence the insurance role of commons. I add interaction terms of group-level shocks 
with the coefficient of variations – standard deviations divided by means – of individual 
capital holdings in the group. None of these interaction terms are statistically significant 
and none of the remaining results change significantly (results not shown). Hence, the 
income effect and the resource-augmentation effect of fishing are neutral to fishing 
capital and its within-group inequality. 
10 Mean handicraft revenues earned by victims are negatively correlated with housing 
rehabilitation. This probably suggests that as victims augment handicraft selling, they 
contribute less to risk sharing and thus receive less help from non-victims. This is 
buttressed by the negative correlation with victims’ revenues per non-victim in the group. 
This indicates a potential tradeoff involved in ex post labor-supply decisions, the better 
exploration of which requires an examination of consumption smoothing. 
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Table 1. Cyclone damage by housing damage, variance decomposition of cyclone damage, and housing rehabilitation.
Village Group House-hold
Household-level shocks:
Housing damaged dummy 0.53 (0.50) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) - 6.6 16.1 77.3
Housing partially damaged dummy 0.45 (0.50) 0.00 (0.00) 0.84 (0.37) - 6.8 14.4 78.8
Housing completely damaged dummy 0.08 (0.28) 0.00 (0.00) 0.16 (0.37) - 1.6 13.8 84.7
Crop damaged dummy 0.86 (0.35) 0.86 (0.35) 0.86 (0.35) 0.236 5.7 10.8 83.5
Crop damage per adult equivalent (F$) 34.4 (44.7) 35.1 (49.5) 33.8 (40.1) 0.396 2.7 13.6 83.7
Group-level shocks: 
Proportion of housing damaged in the kin group 0.53 (0.24) 0.41 (0.23) 0.64 (0.19) 0.000
Proportion of housing partially damaged in the kin group 0.45 (0.23) 0.34 (0.21) 0.54 (0.21) 0.000
Proportion of housing completely destroyed in the kin group 0.08 (0.11) 0.07 (0.10) 0.10 (0.12) 0.125
Proportion of crop damaged in the kin group 0.86 (0.14) 0.86 (0.14) 0.85 (0.14) 0.730
Kin-group mean of crop damage 34.4 (18.0) 34.2 (18.6) 34.5 (17.5) 0.919
Housing rehabilitation among victims (n=170):
Complete housing repair dummy - - 0.55 (0.50) -
New housing construction dummy - - 0.09 (0.29) -
Household meansa Mean/
prop. test 
(p-value)b
Variance 
decompositionc
a Household means are shown along with standard deviations in parentheses. 
b Results with a 5% significance level are bolded.
c These are percents of total variance.
All
(n=332)
Non-victims
(n=155)
Victims
(n=177)
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Table 2. Household labor activities and characteristics.
Income per adult equivalent per month a year ago - pre-cyclone (F$):
Cropping 60.2 (90.8) 65.1 (91.6) 55.9 (90.1)
Fishing 32.1 (44.8) 34.4 (59.6) 30.2 (25.7)
NTFP gathering and handicraft sellinga 1.2 (3.6) 1.1 (4.0) 1.3 (3.3)
Permanent wage labora 10.7 (41.8) 12.3 (51.1) 9.2 (31.7)
Casual wage labora 0.5 (3.2) 0.4 (2.6) 0.6 (3.7)
Otherb 6.9 (44.5) 6.5 (21.4) 7.3 (57.7)
Total 112 (118) 120 (120) 104 (115)
Current income per adult equivalent per month - post-cyclone (F$):
Cropping 34.9 (59.6) 38.9 (55.1) 31.3 (63.2)
Fishing 21.6 (33.6) 24.7 (42.5) 18.8 (22.8)
NTFP gathering and handicraft sellinga 3.2 (10.6) 3.4 (10.3) 3.1 (11.0)
Permanent wage labora 10.1 (40.9) 11.5 (50.0) 9.0 (30.9)
Casual wage labora 0.9 (5.4) 0.5 (2.9) 1.3 (6.9)
Otherb 3.0 (12.3) 4.3 (15.3) 1.9 (8.8)
Total 73.7 (83.2) 83.2 (85.6) 65.3 (80.3)
Household characteristics a year ago - pre-cyclone:
Land per adult equivalent (acre) 1.1 (1.5) 1.1 (1.4) 1.1 (1.5)
Fishing capital per adult equivalent (F$) 107 (423) 141 (576) 77 (211)
Adults' secondary education dummy 0.83 (0.37) 0.82 (0.39) 0.85 (0.36)
Household size (adult equivalent) 4.9 (2.2) 4.8 (2.1) 5.0 (2.3)
Age of household head 48.6 (13.9) 50.5 (14.0) 46.9 (13.7)
Female head dummy 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.32)
B. Household NTFP gathering and handicraft sales by quarter.
Participation (n=223):
NTFP gathering 0.58 (0.49) 0.00 (0.07) 0.11 (0.32) 0.22 (0.41)
Handicraft sales 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.32) 0.19 (0.39) 0.22 (0.42)
Revenues per adult equivalent per month (F$) (n=223):
NTFP gathering 0.81 (2.72) 0.00 (0.00) 0.29 (1.20) 0.81 (3.48)
Handicraft sales 0.73 (3.29) 0.53 (2.34) 1.23 (3.87) 3.86 (12.2)
0.508
0.458
0.872
All
(n=332)
Non-victims
(n=155)
Victims
(n=177)
0.356
0.354
0.578
0.184
0.073
0.050
Mean/
prop. test 
(p-value)c
0.949
0.169
0.492
0.238
0.245
0.115
0.796
0.397
0.739
a Pre-cyclone and post-cyclone incomes are for periods 1 and 4, respectively. 
b Other income consists of shop profit, livestock selling, and other self-employment activities like 
middleman.  
c Results with a 5% significance level are bolded.
Household means are shown along with standard deviations in parentheses. In panel B, six handicraft 
villages are covered and revenues are for all households, not participants.
Pre-cyclone Post-cyclone
A. Pre- and post-cyclone income and pre-cyclone household characteristics by housing damage.
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
0.022
0.913
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Table 3. Determinants of log fishing revenues per adult equivalent per month - First-difference.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Household-level shocks:
-0.087 -0.141 -0.111 -0.170 -0.061 -0.053
(0.093) (0.094) (0.142) (0.157) (0.106) (0.121)
-0.126 -0.276 -0.021 -0.082 -0.977 * -1.079 * 0.104 0.021
(0.154) (0.192) (0.163) (0.171) (0.466) (0.477) (0.151) (0.212)
0.066 * 0.064 0.051 0.043 0.067 0.049 0.065 0.039 0.169 * 0.177 *
(0.033) (0.043) (0.049) (0.059) (0.041) (0.061) (0.068) (0.080) (0.078) (0.081)
Group-level shocks:
0.269 0.826 * -0.387 0.271 -0.028
(0.212) (0.361) (0.248) (0.427) (0.263)
0.962 * 1.462 ** 0.164 0.924 0.591
(0.457) (0.495) (0.666) (0.581) (0.594)
0.036 0.058 0.164 0.187 -0.040
(0.076) (0.133) (0.122) (0.154) (0.093)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000
0.150 0.163 0.162 0.208 0.155 0.170 0.168 0.188 0.317 0.322
No. observations 664 664 310 310 354 354 332 332 332 332
F (p-value)
R squared
No/small crop 
damageVictims
Log crop damage per adult 
equivalent (F$)
Non-victims Large crop damage
*5% significance, **1% significance, ***.1% significance. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses of columns (1), (3), (5), (7), and (9) and standard 
errors clustered by group are in the parentheses of columns (2), (4), (6), (8), and (10). All models include a time dummy and village-time dummies. In 
columns (7)-(10), sample division is based on the median of crop damage value per adult equivalent. 
All
Proportion of housing completely 
damaged in the kin group
Kin-group mean of log crop damage 
per adult equivalent (F$)
Housing partially damaged dummy
Housing completely damaged 
dummy
Proportion of housing partially 
damaged in the kin group
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Fishing Handicraft selling
(1) (2)
Total revenues All 0.094 0.088
(0.097) (0.193)
Non-victims 0.121 0.094
(0.033) (0.166)
Victims 0.060 0.003
(0.292) (0.968)
All 0.030 -0.086
(0.593) (0.203)
Non-victims 0.081 0.110
(0.154) (0.103)
Victims -0.050 -0.232
(0.377) (0.001)
Non-victims 0.231 0.091
(0.000) (0.176)
Victims 0.017 -0.143
(0.767) (0.036)
No. groups 43 28
Correlations (weighted by kin group size) of the proportion of housing 
rehabilitated among victims in the kin group with various post-cyclone revenues 
per month in the same kin group defined in the text are shown along with p-
values in parentheses (those with a 5% significance level are bolded). 
Handicraft revenues are from six handicraft villages in periods 2-4. 
Revenues per victim 
(per adult equivalent)
Revenues per non-victim 
(per adult equivalent)
Table 4. Group correlations of housing rehabilitation with post-cyclone 
fishing and handicraft selling. 
Mean revenues 
(per adult equivalent)
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(n=446) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household-level shocks:
-0.73 -0.74 -0.43 -0.54 -0.44 -0.89
(0.46) (0.47) (0.55) (0.46) (0.56) (0.58)
0.31 0.78 0.81 0.98 3.25 * 1.90
(0.46) (0.86) (0.69) (0.75) (1.34) (1.94)
0.21 0.23 0.39 ** 0.35 *** 0.16 0.27
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16) (0.20)
Group-level shocks:
1.20 1.16 4.35
(2.77) (1.30) (2.42)
-1.88 0.32 1.72
(3.13) (2.22) (3.66)
0.15 0.65 0.85
(0.54) (0.46) (0.45)
0.022 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
19.3 20.2 38.7 53.3 82.7 88.0
Table 5. Determinants of log handicraft revenues per adult equivalent per month - Trimmed 
least squares.
Housing completely damaged 
dummy
Proportion of housing partially 
damaged in the kin group
Proportion of housing completely 
damaged in the kin group
Wald (p-value)
*5% significance, **1% significance, ***.1% significance. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
All models include a time dummy and village-time dummies. 
Loss function
Kin-group mean of log crop 
damage per adult equivalent (F$)
Periods 1 and 3 Periods 1 and 4
Housing partially damaged dummy
Log crop damage per adult 
equivalent (F$)
Periods 1 and 2
 
